Stephen Crabb: Understanding, as the Under-Secretary does, the importance of the road network to the Welsh economy, does he agree that duelling the A40 through Pembrokeshire is vital for the long-term economic success of our county? Does he further agree that the Welsh Assembly's decision not to support that important project is economically illiterate?

Nick Ainger: No, I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman's assessment, given that the bulk of the upgrading of the A40 is in my constituency, as he well knows. Although I have some sympathy for the arguments that have been presented, the cost benefits of duelling the section all the way from St. Clears to Haverfordwest do not stand up. It is far better to get the improvements in place as quickly as possible at a reasonable cost so that we experience the benefits of the road improvement.

Ian Lucas: Pursuant to his oral answer of 20 July, Official Report, columns 1240–41, what discussions he has had with the National Assembly for Wales Government on the use made of office allowances.

Peter Hain: I completely agree with my hon. Friend. It is significant that of the 20 list Assembly Members representing regions of Wales rather than constituencies, 15 have established constituency offices, funded by taxpayers, in the seats where they were last defeated, in order to run campaigns to try to reverse those results. That is a misuse of taxpayers' money. It is interesting that in Scotland and New Zealand, there are different—

Michael Fabricant: If he will make a statement on the application of the Welsh Language Act 1993 to the work of (a) central Government Departments and (b) other public bodies.

Michael Fabricant: I thank the Minister for his answer and I am grateful that he supports the Welsh Language Act, notwithstanding the fact that Rhodri Morgan and others voted against it at the time. Does the Minister acknowledge that there are many people such as myself, who had a Welsh-speaking mother, who would dearly love to learn the language that was originally the British language? Will he join me in praising organisations such as the many Wlpans, and Nant Gwrtheyrn on the Llyn peninsula, which provide training of that kind?

David Davies: One of the chief constables has already estimated that the cost of that reorganisation will be £10 million to £12 million, plus the entire reserves of all four police authorities in Wales. Can the Secretary of State demonstrate his undoubted command of mental arithmetic and tell us how many police officers could be trained up and put on to the crime-ridden streets of Wales for the same sum that will be needed to create this unaccountable bureaucratic monolith?

Peter Hain: First, as a Gwent MP I am sure the hon. Gentleman will want to join me in congratulating Mike Tonge, chief constable of Gwent, who is today receiving the Queen's Police medal in recognition of his distinguished service.
	As regards the hon. Gentleman's rant on this matter, may I invite him, instead of ranting, to display a bit of objectivity? On the figures he quoted from the chief constable of South Wales, which were given at a private meeting to which the hon. Gentleman was invited, she said that her best estimate was that the start-up costs would be about £10 million. She could not be certain, so the hon. Gentleman has upped that figure by a couple of million. She also said that she thought the savings would be three times as much. Why did the hon. Gentleman not raise that point and why did he not make it in the very biased account he gave to the South Wales Argus the other day?

Peter Hain: I have made no such assessments. As I pointed out earlier, however, considerable savings will be possible, which will enable resources to be released not only to fight the new threats, but to make sure that we have as many police officers as possible on the ground in our neighbourhoods. Since our Government came to power, Wales has 950 extra police officers and 270 extra community support officers on patrol. We are driving that forward with even more recruits and even more effective neighbourhood policing in future.

Huw Irranca-Davies: Does my right hon. Friend agree that in line with the strategic reorganisation of the police, it is also vital that we continue the strategy of neighbourhood policing? Will he join me in applauding the work of my right hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Brightside (Mr. Blunkett), who as Home Secretary did so much in driving forward the agenda of community safety and community policing?

Peter Hain: In view of your earlier suggestion, Mr. Speaker, I suggest that my hon. Friend take the matter up with the Welsh Assembly Government.

Michael Howard: I join the Prime Minister in expressing our sympathy and condolences to the family of the British serviceman who lost his life in Afghanistan over the weekend.
	This has been an extraordinary week for the Government, and for the Prime Minister. We have seen the slow seepage of his authority turn into a haemorrhage. We all acknowledge the honourable way in which the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions has decided to resign, and I pay tribute to him for that—but the key question now is for the Prime Minister. Does he think that in his handling of this affair, his judgement has been at fault in any way?

Michael Howard: The Secretary of State has resigned, and I do not intend to pursue those matters this afternoon. I quite understand why the Prime Minister's judgement in these last few days has been awry. I can entirely sympathise with his desire to cling on to the right hon. Member for Sheffield, Brightside (Mr. Blunkett). Is it not a fact that he was one of the Prime Minister's last remaining allies in Cabinet?

Tony Blair: My right hon. Friend resigned for the reasons that he gave: that with the frenzy surrounding him and his job, it became impossible for him to carry on doing that job properly. The reason why I outlined the specific allegations to him is that I think that in fairness to him, people should understand that a lot of what has been written about him in the past few days has, on my investigation of the facts, turned out to be completely untrue. However, for the reasons that he has given, he has resigned.
	I would simply put this to the House: sometimes on these occasions, the degree of pressure to which people are subject is absolutely extraordinary. We should just occasionally reflect on that, and when it involves somebody who has done an immense amount for this country we should say, as he goes from Government, that he goes, in my view, with no stain of impropriety against him whatever.

Tony Blair: I shall deal with each of those claims in turn. On schools, we are in favour not just of investing in them but of reforming them too. We have a programme that we will carry through, because this party believes in improving the quality of schooling in our country. We will do that, and we will carry it through.
	On the so-called proposal to ban drinking on public transport, I had indicated already that we should not accept it.—[Interruption.] However, as often happens when such a proposal is put in the newspapers and we point out that it has not been accepted, we are accused of making a U-turn.
	Leaving that to one side, I can tell the House that over the next few months we will carry through our programme on schools and health service reform, and that new proposals will be brought forward on antisocial behaviour and crime. Today, of course, we have a very important debate on terrorism. All those proposals will be carried through, because we believe in them and because we believe that they are right for the country—and at least we have a programme that we are carrying through.

Dominic Grieve: Our consideration begins with clause 1, which provides the offence of the encouragement of terrorism. Specifically, it seeks to widen the scope of incitement by moving from direct incitement to commit a criminal offence to indirect incitement. Conservative Members believe that a change in the law can properly take place to allow indirect incitement to become a criminal offence, and that proposition may attract universal support.
	The issue that we must consider this afternoon is how the Government have chosen to draft clause 1. There are two areas of concern: first, the intent that is required for an offence to be committed; and secondly, whether the glorification of terrorism should form a separate and discrete part of an incitement charge.
	I find clause 1 almost impossible to read and understand. I do not know where the Government found their draftsman, but if ever there were an unintelligible document, it is clause 1, which is extremely convoluted. It moves from an offence based on a person's knowledge or belief to an offence based on "reasonable grounds for believing". The offence is committed if
	"members of the public to whom the statement is or is to be published are likely to understand it as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences."
	The Minister must clarify what the Government are trying to achieve—the explanatory notes are no help whatever. Do the Government want the offence to be committed by specific intent, which is common ground, and can it be committed by recklessness? By my reading of clause 1, it can also be committed negligently. If my reading of the provision is incorrect, I should be grateful if the Minister would indicate as much at the earliest possible opportunity. My reading of the provision is that it is much wider than an ordinary recklessness test, because it combines the fact of a person's committing the offence only on the basis of having "reasonable grounds for believing" with the fact that members of the public need merely be "likely" to understand that incitement was the intended consequence. That combination, which I could describe as the double whammy of clause 1, goes much further than I would consider to be suitable and proper.

Dominic Grieve: My hon. Friend makes a good point. The clause is indeed unclear as regards members of the public. We must bear in mind that the Government are saying that the individual who is making his comment of encouragement of terrorism should be mindful of every possible range of public opinion. I do not necessarily disagree with that, but it then reverses the onus back to saying that we have to be jolly careful not to criminalise what may merely be a negligent statement. Heaven knows we have enough examples of Ministers standing up in this House and accidentally saying things that they subsequently have cause to regret.

Martin Horwood: As the hon. Member for Buckingham (Mr. Bercow) suggested, this might happen inadvertently in less than thoughtful circumstances. Is the hon. Gentleman aware that Universities UK fears that it might happen in extremely thoughtful circumstances, namely in the process of the publication of research and the encouragement of academic debate? It states that the Bill
	"opens the question as to whether an individual student who may disagree with a lecturer's personal political view could be reported and then prosecuted for glorifying terrorism . . . It seems highly likely that students undertaking courses like International Relations, History and Politics may be exposed to or research on texts that could fall foul of Clauses 1, 2 and 6 of this Bill."

Dominic Grieve: I understand the hon. Gentleman's point—I have been trying to deal with it for the past 20 minutes. It is clear that part of the offence is specific intent, for which clause 1(b)(i) provides. Under it, people can know or believe that they are trying to incite terrorism and they can be convicted for it. However, as the hon. Gentleman says, the Government wish to widen its scope. To what point is it being widened? I believe that it is being widened well beyond the recklessness test—the old test that was often put into statutes to ensure that someone could not wriggle off the hook by saying, "Oh well, I may have said people should blow themselves up in Kensington high street, but I didn't really mean it." There is difference between that and negligence, which may constitute a negligent comment of the kind that many a Minister or Member of Parliament has frequently made on the Floor of the House and regretted afterwards. The Minister must deal with that distinction this afternoon.
	Glorification is a completely separate issue. We know the origin of the glorification provisions. The Bill started out with a completely separate offence of glorifying terrorism and received massive public criticism. Consequently, the Government conducted a classic piece of new Labour dissimulation. On the one hand, they announced that they were backing down in the face of the criticism, but, on the other, they tried somehow to save the Prime Minister's face by ensuring that glorification survived. I strongly suspect that there were long and disputatious moments in No. 10 Downing street between the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister.

Douglas Hogg: Very courageous!

John Bercow: It might be argued that an academic treatise was precisely the kind of example in which glorification would not imply any desire to emulate an activity. The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) wrongly takes comfort from the notion of an inter-linkage—in a sense, a mutual dependence—between the three separate concepts that he mentioned. May I suggest that it is not a good idea for there to be three such concepts in any one clause—let alone a subsection—and certainly not when there is no requirement to prove intent?

Alistair Carmichael: Let me first offer a few words of reassurance to the hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews). I detected a real note of concern in his voice when he told us that, in rushing to the defence of Cherie Booth, QC, he had blotted his copybook by defending someone residing at No. 10 Downing street. My understanding is that, while Cherie Booth's husband's place of work may well be No. 10 Downing street, she actually resides at No. 11. Whether he acted intentionally, recklessly or negligently, I think that the hon. and learned Gentleman has maintained his proud record.
	The kindest thing that can be said about clause 1 is that parts of it are opaque. Other parts border on the impenetrable. In my view and that of my colleagues, it fails a basic test. One of the fundamental principles of natural justice is that law should be clear enough for citizens to be able to regulate their conduct according to it. Subsection (1) uses the words
	"members of the public to whom the statement is or is to be published are likely to understand it as".
	That means that someone could find himself negligently contravening clause 1, which is why we cannot support it in its current form—notwithstanding the consensus referred to by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), in which I would wish to join him.
	The Minister will say that it will be all right on the night, because the Solicitor-General or the Attorney-General will determine which prosecutions can proceed, and of course Law Officers and Governments always act sensibly in such cases. Like the hon. Member for Buckingham (John Bercow), I do not find that particularly reassuring. It is not for the House of Commons to pass legislation under which the citizen must second-guess the judgment of a Law Officer before deciding whether his conduct will bring him before the courts.
	One might ask whether this really matters. We have heard, and will no doubt hear again, all the Government assurances, but where the law is opaque and difficult to understand, it is also difficult to secure convictions following prosecutions. If members of a jury cannot see the sense in what is being done by the prosecutor, they will acquit. In framing clause 1 as they have, the Government seek to defeat their own purposes. At the very least, the clause ought to contain a substantial element of intent which is not there now. That is the purpose of our amendment No. 18, amendment No. 79—tabled by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield and his colleagues—and various other amendments.
	It cannot be acceptable that an offence attracting such a substantial penalty can be committed negligently. The next question to consider is whether recklessness can be imported. Here I tend to agree more with the hon. Member for Beaconsfield than with the hon. and learned Member for Medway, but I do not consider the issue to be one of great substance. The important point is the presence of a substantial element of intent. Whether an objective or a subjective test is applied to establish that intent—which is where recklessness comes in—can be considered another day. Viewing the matter from my perspective as a former prosecutor, however, I think that if the offence is ever to be made workable, the recklessness option ought to be available to the prosecuting authorities.
	The Government have moved substantially since the early days when glorification was first mooted as an offence in its own right, and the Liberal Democrats welcome that. Nevertheless, if the Committee supports amendment No. 4 and removes the glorification provision, we shall be doing the Government a favour. The provision seems to me to have no purpose, other than to save the Government's face to some extent, given that the Prime Minister started this hare and set it running. Of course glorification will be there as an adminicle of evidence that can be considered by the jury, but including it in the Bill adds nothing and, indeed, widens the scope to an unacceptable degree. When we see it in a context of a Bill that does not, in my opinion, give a proper definition of terrorism, we find ourselves in an exceptionally difficult position.
	This morning, the Home Secretary got into some difficulty on the "Today" programme when the interviewer referred to the hon. Member for Belfast, West (Mr. Adams), who was considered by many to have glorified terrorism on a number of occasions in the past. Indeed, I think that, even if the clause were amended comprehensively, much of what the hon. Member for Belfast, West did in the past would still be caught. It must also be said, however, that the hon. Member played a significant role in the ending of terrorism in Northern Ireland. Perhaps we should pause for thought before considering the full import of what will be achieved by the creation of offences such as this.
	The question for the Committee is this: does subsection (2) add or subtract anything? I do not think that it adds anything, but it contributes massively to the lack of clarity in clause 1, and I therefore believe that it should be removed.

Alex Salmond: The President would then be fighting a legal war—unlike the one that his son pursued—but, given the international scope of the Bill, he would simultaneously find himself on the wrong side of the domestic law of the United Kingdom. Even somebody pursuing an internationally legal action could find that action illegal under this ridiculous Bill.

Alan Simpson: That highlights the paradoxes and absurdities in the Bill.
	A couple of weeks ago Parliament added to the list of proscribed organisations an Uzbek organisation calling for the removal of the Karimov regime and free democratic elections. Apparently we did so on the advice of the intelligence services that the group in question was responsible for acts of terrorism within its own country. Two days later, in The Guardian, the then British ambassador to Uzbekistan took issue with that and, as someone who had visited the sites where it was claimed that acts of terrorism had taken place, said that they all bore the hallmarks of Government killings, with an attempt to set up the notion that they had been committed by terrorists, although there was no evidence to support that claim.
	We know that Uzbekistan is a regime with a wretched record of persecuting its own citizens, torturing them and boiling them in oil. It is a horrible regime by any standards, and we ought to be able to call on the international community and the domestic communities to remove it—but under the definition in the Bill, we would not be allowed to do so.
	The far-reaching consequences of the Bill in its current form are so draconian as to provide legislation that could virtually have been drafted for us by al-Qaeda. If we want to see acts that destroy the framework of liberties, confidence in democracy, accountability to the judiciary and rights of representation, they are to be found enshrined in much of the panic legislation that has been pushed through this House as an extension of the war in Iraq in the form of a war on our own liberties. We are doing what al-Qaeda sought to do by other means, and society will not thank us for it.
	Those who say that there are lock-in provisions in the preconditions about encouragement, glorification and emulation need to look at clause 1(4), which points out that it is
	"irrelevant . . . whether any person is in fact encouraged or induced by the statement to commit, prepare or instigate any such . . . offence."
	So it does not matter what people do; it is the act of saying or writing that constitutes the criminal offence—indeed, the terrorist offence—under the Bill.
	I know that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Medway ducked the question about extraterrestrial activities—I assume that that should have been "extra-territorial"—but I want to draw the attention of the House to the fact that an in-house consequence would follow from the Bill, under the current definition of terrorism. I know that we will come to that at a later stage, but people such as myself who have pledged to be part of the Green Gloves campaign against the growing of genetically modified crops, were they to be allowed in the UK—those of us who will doubtless go out and seek to remove those crops and replace them with organic non-contaminating crops—would be in breach of the Terrorism Bill; and also if we made the intellectual and political case for doing that.
	There are many people outside the House who are extremely happy to see the definition of terrorism widened in a way that will allow global corporate interests to define civilian and domestic opposition to the policies that they are trying to push through, not as acts of resistance by consumers but as acts of environmental terrorism—a phrase that they are already beginning to use. They will use exactly the same terms as appear in clause 1, and say that people are guilty of acts of encouragement, glorification and encouraging others to emulate what they have done—and thus are committing terrorist offences.
	The dangers of criminalising the whole framework of social protest and resistance within our own society is a dreadful draconian step. I would love it if the Bill would allow us to prosecute the President of the United States—but he will not be brought before the courts. Neither will the Baptist minister in the United States who, interviewed on Channel 4 News last week, openly said, with regard to the 7/7 bombings in London, that the only shame about it was that 1 million people were not killed. He said that England deserved to be bombed in that way. Will he be branded as a terrorist? Will he be brought to trial before the UK courts? No.
	The Rev. Pat Robertson, the head of the Christian Coalition in the United States, will not be brought to trial here either, although he has openly, on television, called for the assassination of the elected President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. No one like that will be brought before the courts, but Muslim lads in this country making similar claims or criticisms about events in the middle east are precisely the ones who will be picked up. They will be defined as being in breach of the terms of the Bill, because it is not directed at crazy mullahs who are notionally on "our" side, but only at the crazies on other people's sides.
	The real danger is that the Bill is a first step down the path that leads us away from judging people on what they do. In the end, we will all be judged—by our own courts or by international courts—on the acts that we commit. However, we are starting to move away from that premise and to judge people, in broad and speculative terms, on what they say.
	The next step will be to judge people on what they think. For me, that is the hallmark of a society that is beginning to retreat from the founding and fundamental principles of an open and democratic society, and to take its Parliament, institutions and citizens into dark days of tyranny. That is why I urge the House to support amendments that will change this absurd clause.

Kenneth Clarke: I shall come to that in a moment, but for now I want to endorse what has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and by the spokesman for the Liberal Democrats, among others. I agree that it is completely unacceptable that a person could commit the proposed offence merely through carelessness or negligence. If it is judged that there is reasonable cause to believe that a member of the public might feel a bit encouraged by something that is said to him or her, that amounts to what I suppose that we are meant to regard as a serious criminal offence.
	That is completely unacceptable, and the proposal should never have been presented to the House. For me, the strongest point in the discussion about clause 1 is that the intention to incite terrorism must be the minimum requirement in an offence of indirect incitement. The role of intention is fundamental in the creation of an offence of that kind. If intention were necessary, it would explain why the provision is not otiose because it would provide an alternative form of words to those already on the statute book. I would accept that it should be an offence for someone to intend to incite someone else to act in preparation for or commission of terrorism. As it is, I think that that is already covered, but I would not object to the provision. I would regard that as a grave offence and it should carry heavy penalties, unless it is part of some absurd drunken outburst, but the provision would touch on all sorts of forms of words and mean that all kinds of literature, speeches or stray remarks could be seen as encouraging preparation for terrorism if some member of the public happened to hear them and was affected in that way. That is unacceptable.
	When we have put such points to Ministers, the response has been—as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) just pointed out—"Ah, but the Attorney-General would not prosecute." In many cases, this House rightly passes laws, but because we know that the law might be exploited and ridiculous litigation might result—because people with particular interests might use it against their rivals in some political or religious dispute—we make it a condition that the Attorney-General, as a Law Officer of the Crown, is the only person who can bring a conviction. That removes the abuse of the threat of prosecution and the Attorney-General can ensure that a prosecution would involve a serious issue of public policy before it is brought. However, I have never known that practice to be taken to the lengths to which it is taken in the Bill. The need for the Attorney-General's approval should not be used to try to rescue a uselessly drafted piece of legislation that might criminalise works of literature. The examples already given have illustrated the absurdity of the clause. It should not be an answer to say, "Well, of course, all kinds of extraordinary things might be made unlawful by the Bill, but let us just pass this catch-all legislation and rely on the wise Attorney-General to ensure that only serious criminals face prosecution." I strongly urge against such an approach to legislation.
	Throughout today, we should apply the test that the Government have applied when exhorting us all not to be soft on terrorism and to pass various other aspects of this legislation. If we are all fearful of the increased risk of terrorism—I suspect that we will face it for many years to come—we should ask of the proposals whether any sensible person would feel any safer if they were passed. That is the right test, and I would advise the most nervous of my fellow citizens, who lie awake at night worrying about the threat of terrorism, that they should not be deceived into thinking that clause 1 would make the slightest difference to their predicament. It is ridiculous and absurd, and it should never have been brought before us.
	The Bill has been dragged together to give the impression of a dynamic and tough Government who are taking firm action in response to the recent outrages. If all they can produce to demonstrate firm action is this absurd legislation, the House has a duty to throw it out. If the Government begin the four days of proceedings on the Bill by defending such a provision, I fear what they will say when it comes to other significant elements within it.

Peter Bone: I am grateful to be called to speak in this highly important debate on proposals that, if they were accepted without change, would threaten the very civil liberties that every Briton expects. I shall begin by making it clear that I believe that there is no excuse for terrorism. Terrorism is evil. Terrorists take the lives of innocent men, women and children. Terrorists maim and injure innocent men, women and children. There must never be any excuse for them and, when caught, they must face the severest punishment. There must be a war on terrorism so that we can continue to live in a free society without fear. We must be tough on terrorism. We must punish those who threaten the order of democracy and freedom in this country by undertaking terrorist activities. And if I thought for one minute that these clauses would reduce terrorism, I would vote for them—but I do not.
	The question is whether the provisions would reduce terrorism or encourage it. In my opinion, an offence of encouragement and glorification of terrorism would encourage terrorism rather than reduce it. The provisions add nothing to the existing law that is in place to deal with terrorist suspects. These additions to the current terrorism legislation would do little or nothing that cannot be achieved by existing laws.
	The proposed offence of encouragement and glorification of terrorism would restrict the freedom of speech that we have in this country. Moreover, this offence would further disillusion those people who are targets for terrorist propaganda—those groups in our communities who feel that they have been denied the opportunity of free speech on this issue. That could encourage them to support, rather than prevent them from supporting or even committing acts of terrorism.
	If someone glorifies terrorism in any way, they could be charged under the current offence of incitement to commit an existing terrorist offence or—perhaps better—their comments could be exposed and dealt with freely in our society, which allows for argument and debate. What we as a country need to do is expose those people who glorify terrorism, and then present our arguments to them through the television, radio, newspapers, the internet and even in the local pub. Line by line, we should expose why their views on terrorism are wrong, flawed and evil. It is free speech, argument and leadership that win people over. It is regimes such as Stalin's, Hitler's and Saddam Hussein's that think that people can be won over by denying free speech. If Governments restrict people over what they can say, they tread a dangerous path indeed.
	We have been here before. The hon. Member for Belfast, West (Mr. Adams), who appeared to be a spokesman for the IRA—undoubtedly terrorists—had his free speech restricted. We all remember the ridiculous occasions when the hon. Gentleman appeared on television with his voice dubbed by an actor because of the restrictions imposed by a previous Government. When we finally heard the real voice of the hon. Gentleman, it was less eloquent than the actor. But those restrictions succeeded only in giving credence to the IRA. Had we instead argued the case against the hon. Gentleman's views, we would have exposed the IRA and not acted as a recruiting sergeant. Why have we not learnt from that episode? Trying to silence people in such circumstances does not work. It allows extreme minority arguments to grow out of proportion, and it plays into the hands of terrorists.
	I would have preferred it if some practical solutions to the problems of countering terrorism had been included in the Bill. We have heard much talk about counter-terrorism methods through the law, but what exactly has been done in practice to improve security on the tube since 7 July?

Peter Bone: I was just trying to say that there are better ways to approach the issue than to attack the freedom of every person in this country to say what they feel. I do not understand how banning the glorification of terrorism will prevent terrorism. It plays into the hands of the people who want to do such things. That is an Alice in Wonderland approach—completely the wrong way round—[Interruption.] I did not catch that sedentary comment.
	The provisions should be rejected for three reasons. First, they are unnecessary; there are laws already in place, so why create new ones? Secondly, they restrict the individual's freedom of speech. The third reason—to my mind, the main one—is the great danger that the provisions will encourage rather than reduce terrorism.

Elfyn Llwyd: I am obliged to you, Mr. Forth.
	I rise to speak to amendments Nos. 62 and 63, both of which stand in my name and the names of my colleagues in Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National party. Picking up the remark made by the hon. Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Bone) that we do not need new legislation, I shall go through the existing legislation.
	By virtue of section 4 of the Offences Against The Person Act 1861, it is already an offence to
	"encourage, persuade, or endeavour to persuade . . . any person, to murder any other person".
	Under section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, it is already an offence to counsel or procure any other person to commit any indictable offence. Under the common law it is an offence to solicit or incite another person to commit any indictable offence. Under section 59 of the Terrorism Act 2000, it is an offence to incite
	"another person to commit an act of terrorism wholly or partly outside the United Kingdom".
	Under section 1A of the Criminal Law Act 1977, it is an offence to conspire with others to commit offences outside the United Kingdom. Under section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000, it is an offence to invite support for a proscribed terrorist organisation.
	Taking into account that raft of existing legislation, my firm belief is that we do not need new legislation. It would be far better to enforce the current law properly. The knee-jerk reaction of the present Government is always to create a new offence.

Elfyn Llwyd: The problem with the Bill is that it widens the remit and lowers the threshold of proof. "Conspire", "incite", "solicit" and "invite" are legally definable words, with specific intent attached. In clause 1, however, we have a mish-mash whereby someone could find him or herself in prison for seven years for negligently having supported some form of terrorism in the past. The National Library of Wales is extremely concerned about scholars there writing about acts of alleged terrorism in days gone by, because those treatises and scholarly works may well be caught up in this ridiculous, uncalled-for Bill.

Evan Harris: I shall speak to amendments Nos. 97, 95 and 96, which are in my name, and wish to do so in the context of the Home Secretary's declaration on the front of the Bill that, in his view, its provisions are compatible with the European convention on human rights.
	I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. We will no doubt produce a report on this issue, and I do not claim that my views are those of the Committee, but we have heard a great deal of evidence and opinion on whether the measures in the Bill—particularly clause 1—are compatible. I want to give the Committee some information with which I agree and which suggests that they are not compatible.
	The Government claim that clause 1 seeks to implement article 5 of the European convention on the prevention of terrorism, which they signed on 16 May 2005. Indeed, paragraph 20 of the explanatory notes states:
	"The offence has been introduced to implement the requirements of Article 5 of the Council of Europe Convention for the Prevention of Terrorism . . . This requires State parties to have an offence of 'public provocation to commit a terrorist offence'. This new offence supplements the existing common law offence of incitement to commit an offence."
	In fact, article 5 does not end at that point. It is headed "Article 5—Public provocation to commit a terrorist offence" and continues:
	"For the purposes of this Convention, 'public provocation to commit a terrorist offence' means the distribution, or otherwise making available, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist offence, where such conduct, whether or not directly advocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more such offences may be committed."
	It is critical that we understand the difference between the wording of the article that the Government seek to implement and the wording of clause 1. Article 5 clearly requires specific intent, which we have discussed, whereas under clause 1 it is sufficient for the perpetrator to have "reasonable grounds" for believing that
	"members of the public to whom the statement is or is to be published are likely to understand it as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences."
	My amendments are distinct from other amendments in the group, because they require the intended outcome as the commission of a terrorist offence, not just its preparation or instigation. To borrow the wording of article 5, they deal with an act that
	"causes a danger that one or more such offences may be committed".
	In his evidence to the Joint Committee, the Home Secretary made it clear that the clause will apply not just to so-called Islamic terrorists but to animal rights terrorists. I urge the right hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Denham) to bear that in mind. My constituency is plagued by animal rights terrorism, and people who defend animal rights make the point that violence begets violence, so violence against animals warrants a response. They believe that research laboratories are either a legitimate target for action or—this would be a lesser incitement—places of torture and that it is therefore legitimate to damage them. I clearly do not support such statements, but the Committee should bear it in mind that, according to the Home Secretary's declaration, the Bill is intended to cover that general incitement.
	In arguing that the Bill does not comply with the European convention on human rights we should remember how much store the European Court sets by its case law and jurisprudence on freedom of speech, particularly article 10.2 of the ECHR. In paragraph 2 of its ruling on the case of Ceylan v. Turkey it said:
	"Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and each individual's self-fulfilment."
	Consequently, any proposed restrictions must be subjected to close scrutiny to determine whether the measure is both necessary and proportionate, and complies with the grounds on which the right may be limited under article 10.2.
	On the questions of necessity, clarity and intention, clause 1 fails the test, as it does on the issue of using the right words for the danger of causing someone to commit a terrorist offence. It therefore falls short of our duty to comply with the ECHR. In a recent case, el-Faisal used language that, the Government would accept, should be caught. He was convicted under existing law of a number of offences, including solicitation to murder under section 4 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, as the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd) said. That provision is likely to be used in a current sub judice case. The question of whether clause 1 is necessary is therefore key.
	There are problems with intention, and I shall not repeat what has been said. However, the minimum requirement is that the clause should provide for intention. As for the causal link with violence, clause 1 merely requires that "members of the public" to whom a statement is published are likely to understand it as "encouragement" to undertake terrorist acts. There is no requirement to show that anyone is, in fact, encouraged by the statement, and causality is further attenuated because members of the public can include anyone in the world, depending on the way in which the statement is published. There are therefore concerns that the provision is too wide to fulfil our obligations. Paragraph 100 of the explanatory notes to the Council of Europe's convention on the prevention of torture states that
	"the result of such an act must be to cause a danger that such an offence might be committed. When considering whether such danger is caused, the nature of the author and of the addressee of the message, as well as the context in which the offence is committed shall be taken into account in the sense established by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. The significance and credible nature of the danger should be considered when applying this provision in accordance with the requirements of domestic law."
	No such provision appears in the Bill, so amendments Nos. 97, 95 and 96 seek to introduce one. Will the Minister for Policing, Security and Community Safety explain why she has not used the wording of the convention on the prevention of torture? Does she believe that it is equivalent to the wording of the Bill? No one who gave evidence to the Joint Committee thought that it was, and the wording of the clause is wider than the wording of the convention.
	Finally, are we talking about what is know as an "apologie du terrorisme" in European case law? The language of the convention avoids such terms and phraseology, and there is no evidence that such terminology should be included. Is it right for the Government to use terms that many people deem to be equivalent to such language? Justice says that if clause 1 is not to breach the right to free expression under article 10.2 of the ECHR, a court would have to agree that the restrictions that it imposes on free expression are made in pursuance of a legitimate aim. I accept that the Government are pursuing a legitimate aim in the clause, but we must consider whether they strike a fair balance between the fundamental right to fair expression and a proportionate attempt to pursue their aim. My view—and I fear that this may well be happen if the clause is passed unamended—is that the European court will not find that to be the case, so I urge the Minister to clarify the thinking behind the provision.
	I urge the Committee to support my amendments, as we must make sure that we protect freedom of speech. We should recognise that the Government have a legitimate aim, but it must be balanced by other rights. The amendments achieve that, but the clause does not.

Douglas Hogg: I know you want me to be brief, Mr. Forth, and I will be. In any event, I had the good fortune to speak in the Second Reading debate.
	I find myself in total agreement with the right hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Frank Dobson). His criticisms of the Bill, and especially of the clause, are shared widely among hon. Members. I suspect that the Government will be alarmed by the fact that in this afternoon's debate not one voice has been raised in favour of the Government's position.
	The right hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Denham) posed the right questions for the Committee to address: first, is the threshold of the Bill too low; secondly, is the definition of terrorism too broad; and, thirdly, will it prevent anybody from being drawn into terrorism? When we consider the amendments, we should address precisely those questions. I share the right hon. Gentleman's view, so I support the amendments tabled by the hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) and by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve).
	As for whether the threshold is too low, I say it is manifestly so. There ought to be the specific intent referred to by the hon. and learned Member for Medway. The glorification clause set out in subsection (2) should be struck out because it goes far, far too wide and would penalise many statements made by hon. Members over many years in many different circumstances.
	I am well aware that we will address the second question—the broadness of the definition—in some detail tomorrow. Suffice it to say that I find it extraordinary that we are not making allowance for acts that many people would characterise as those of freedom fighters. It is bizarre, as I observed to the hon. Member for Nottingham, South (Alan Simpson), that it is legitimate for the Government to go to war against Iraq to procure regime change, yet if we were to have urged the citizens of Iraq—as we did, incidentally, in the first Gulf war—to rise up against the regime of Saddam Hussein, we would have been committing an offence under the Bill.
	My final point addresses the last point made by the right hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen: will the Bill prevent anybody from being drawn into terrorism? I believe not, because I think it will create martyrs. However, we must consider the proportionality of the response. If a catch-all provision of the kind contemplated in clause 1 and in particular in subsection (2) also renders unlawful many acts that in all conscience should never be treated as unlawful, even if it did prevent one person from being drawn into terrorism, it would be wrong.
	Even if it is true, as I acknowledge, that the filter of the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Attorney-General is available in appropriate cases—which will prevent prosecutions in the majority of cases, as I said before—nevertheless, the fear of prosecution will be a real check on free speech. Societies that undermine free speech are beginning to destroy the process by which they remain democratic. We go down that road at our peril.

Dominic Grieve: The debate has indeed been fascinating, but the Minister seemed to illustrate the muddled thinking from which the Government are suffering when it crystallised around what a freedom fighter and a terrorist might be. The description that she provided for the Committee was that if an Iraqi had stood up at a public meeting in the middle of the 1990s, or indeed in 1998, and said that conditions in Iraq were such that the violent overthrow of Saddam Hussein was necessary and that people should take active steps towards it—a policy that at the time was at least tacitly supported by the Labour Government of the late 1990s, when some military action was being taken against the Iraqis by the use of air strikes—that person would now be committing a criminal offence. That may be a new Blairite doctrine. I do not know, because the Prime Minister has said on several occasions that the rules of the game have changed. However, if that is the case, we need a proper debate about it, because the Government are introducing that offence by the back door.
	I appreciate that we shall have an opportunity tomorrow to consider definitions of terrorism, but at present terrorism is undefined, except by our domestic circumstance, and the Government, by passing the Bill and clause 1, will without the slightest doubt criminalise those who even negligently call for action to be taken in such circumstances. We can see that from the debate. For the Minister to come to the Committee and ask us to approve that is breathtaking.
	We said at the outset that we want to work constructively with the Government, but we are in Committee and, apart from Report, this is our last opportunity to do something about clause 1.
	I am glad that the Minister said that she will consider the problem of the wording of clause 1 and whether the negligence extension is justified. However, she has known about Members' anxieties for some time, yet no concrete proposals have been presented to us this afternoon to solve or remedy the problem. That makes my life—and that of any hon. Member who wants to provide some broad support for the Government's aims but is anxious about the detail—difficult. Those points were well made in the debate by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke) and my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Bone). As the right hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Denham) said, if we get it wrong, we will make things worse.
	I listened carefully to the comments of the right hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen in a debate on terrorism and community cohesion in Westminster Hall last week. From my experience of contact with the Muslim community in Britain, I agreed with almost everything he said. It is worrying that, at this stage of our proceedings, the problem remains and the clause is so poorly drafted.
	If the Minister intends to make a concession, why cannot she accept amendment No. 79? It takes the first necessary step. Two more steps are needed—one relates to terrorism and the other to glorification—to make the Bill workable and fair. We need a tight recklessness test on specific intent, not the existing loose, opaque and wide-ranging catch-all provision. I regret that it has taken a long debate to extract from the Government just how wide ranging the clause is intended to be. Any hon. Member who is considering what to do this afternoon should bear in mind that clause 1 criminalises negligence. On the whole, we are reluctant to do that in this country.
	I am sorry to tell the Minister that I shall seek to press amendment No. 79 to a vote. I invite all hon. Members who are worried about the wording to join me in trying to get it improved. No one can claim that amendment No. 79 would wreck the Bill—it would do no such thing. It leaves clause 1 in a perfectly workable condition but makes it clear that the offence of encouragement cannot be committed by negligence.
	The other matters that we have considered include the provisions relating to glorification. The Minister has not provided a single justification for keeping those provisions in the Bill. As was rightly said in the debate, the concept of glorification is alien to our legal system. Why retain it when it will cause the endless problems that the right hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen highlighted? It could easily be removed, leaving a perfectly workable clause. Again, nobody can claim that we would wreck the clause. I therefore hope that, after we have voted on amendment No. 79, we will have the opportunity to vote on amendment No. 4, which would ensure the removal of the subsection relating to glorification.
	I am conscious that the hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) has also tabled well-reasoned amendments, which he presented with his usual cogency, that seek to restrict the operation and scope of the Bill. On that basis, if we are unsuccessful on amendment No. 79, I shall have no hesitation in supporting the hon. and learned Gentleman if he chooses to move amendments Nos. 21 or 22, although I suspect that he will not be allowed to move both of them. Their purpose is to restrict the offence to one of specific intent only. I would much prefer to see the Bill in that shape at the end of this afternoon than in the incoherent and, frankly, frightening shape in which the Government have left it.
	The Minister and I agree that the basic intention behind the Bill is to ensure that terrorism is curbed, and that those who might be encouraged to engage in it should be discouraged from doing so. However, as the Minister knows from other debates that we have had on these issues, the best way of doing that is to persuade the communities from which terrorists are drawn that they should not succumb to their blandishments, and that it is better to achieve that by voluntary means than by coercion. Clause 1 has a coercive quality, particularly in relation to glorification, that goes well beyond the point to which it should go. For those reasons, I urge the Government to think again on this matter. If they do not, they will find themselves being increasingly obstructed as the Bill progresses. If they would only listen, we could make some progress.

Simon Hughes: In the past, Whips have always been at the entrance of the Chamber, outside its confines, giving advice. Would you be kind enough, Mrs. Heal, to consult the Speaker so that we can have an authoritative ruling on whether Whips are able physically and verbally to influence or intimidate Members from within the Chamber?—[Interruption.]

Dominic Grieve: We now have to consider clause 23 and the extension of the period of detention by judicial authority from 14 days to the Government's proposed 90 days. A large number of amendments to the Government's proposals have been tabled and I shall come to those in greater detail in a moment. However, I should like to deal first with some of the principles that are involved. As the Government acknowledge, this country has always been firm and resolute in maintaining civil liberties, none of which is more important than the expeditious charging or release of individuals who are arrested. The grounds on which someone is arrested need be no more than the reasonable suspicion that an offence has taken place and that the arrested person is connected with it. The purpose of the initial police inquiry is to ascertain whether there is evidence on which a charge can be brought. If so, thereafter, the person is in the hands of the court system as the case proceeds to trial.
	The Home Secretary will acknowledge that the proposals drive a coach and horses through that principle. We are not talking about 24-hour detention without charge or even the seven or 14-day detention period to which we have progressed, but a possible three-month detention—the equivalent of a six-month sentence passed after conviction. During that time, the police and prosecutors can look for evidence against the person in detention. The Government have a great deal to justify if they wish to proceed down that road. They cannot pray in aid other countries' systems to justify their proposals, which are entirely unprecedented in common law jurisdictions. In Australia, despite the terrorist threat, 24 hours remains the period for which someone can be held before charge or release. Even in countries where Ministers have suggested that arrangements are much more flexible, there is a system of inquisitorial inquiry that takes place only after the threshold for charge has been reached. In most instances, the period for which someone can be detained before charge remains extremely short. The Foreign Office has published an extremely useful document on the subject, which I commend to all hon. Members. The present 14-day detention period in this country is at the limit of practices elsewhere, and the three-month proposal takes us outside accepted international practice.
	Hon. Members should remember that, of 895 people arrested until September 2005 under terrorism legislation, only 23 have been charged. The figure may have changed in the past eight weeks, but I am not aware that it has done so. In the past, arrest was, quite understandably, regarded as something that could be used reasonably frequently because the period for which someone could be detained while initial inquiries were made was very short. Indeed, all the codes that were drawn up under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and augmented to protect people in police detention were designed for short periods of detention, including opportunities for intensive questioning that disrupted the suspect's life and could last up to 18 hours in any day.
	The Government's proposals in the Bill simply extend the period of detention to three months with a few safeguards, to which I shall return in a moment. However, they do nothing whatever to address the way in which a completely new regime of detention is to be organised. To take a practical example, very few police stations are suitable places in which to detain someone for three months—I am not even sure that Paddington Green is suitable. If we allow a detention period of up to three months, a suspect could be questioned for 18 hours a day, with the consequence that any confession or information obtained would be slung out by the judge as soon as the case came to court.
	I can think of a few proposals that seem to have emerged so quickly and been presented to the House with so little back-up as to how they would be implemented. The justification that the Government offer is that the Association of Chief Police Officers requested the measure. There was then the suggestion that it was supported by the security services. I noticed with great interest today that when the Prime Minister was asked about that at Prime Minister's Question Time, he told the House about the ACPO support but studiously avoided mention of any other supporting organisations, notwithstanding the fact that the Minister for Policing, Security and Community Safety had suggested earlier that such support from the security services existed. Will the Home Secretary confirm that the proposal is merely ACPO-generated?

Dominic Grieve: I agree that policing in this country has always been done by consent—that is the fundamental basis on which it happens. There are occasions—I acknowledge that the miners' strike was one—when the principle of consent is seriously eroded. We can argue about necessity, but I do not dispute that the miners' strike caused such an erosion, and there are plenty of other examples. It has occurred in some ethnic minority communities and it happened before the Brixton riots. One might say that that is sometimes inevitable, but one should always bear in mind that it happens and consider the consequences. Far from making the country a safer place, it contributes to some of the problems from which we suffer. Once consent is withdrawn, policing has to become more heavy handed, the local community participates less, general crime rates increase and communities begin to suffer badly, becoming thoroughly dysfunctional. We must have regard to that because if we do not, we simply dig a hole for ourselves.

Dominic Grieve: No, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will excuse me.
	Amendment No. 8 is a probing amendment, and is designed to discover the reason for the decision that applications for a warrant of extended detention should no longer be made only by the police but by the Crown prosecutor. The Home Secretary may have some perfectly sensible answers, but I wanted to know the reason for the extension—it is not clear—and what role the Crown Prosecution Service and similar services in other parts of the country will play in determining applications. Hitherto, applications have made by the police. Of course, I know that the Crown Prosecution Service plays a greater part in the charging process, but I hope that we can have some explanation.
	We tabled amendment No. 9 because the Bill is poorly drafted and the amendment deals with one example of that. The sentence to which it applies makes no sense and I assume that the word "a" is missing. However, it highlights the fact that the Government have plunged into legislation in some haste.
	Amendment No. 10 is important. It deals with the way in which the court should regulate the process whereby extended detention takes place. The Bill provides that the police or the prosecutor can ask for an extra seven days. I cannot understand why seven days have been chosen. If someone has been in custody for 32 days, I can think of no reason why the court should not be entitled to say, even in ordinary circumstances, "You can have another 48 hours and no more." Under the Bill, the court can do that only if special circumstances warrant it.
	Let me give a first example of our attempts to improve the Bill. If the Government are to depart from the 14-day rule, the court must play a much more proactive role in determining whether days of detention are justified. Indeed, there is an argument that that should apply to the seven-day rule before the first extension. Simply returning to court on a weekly basis and asking for another seven days is not good enough. The amendment seeks to provide a greater opportunity for the court to exercise its discretion.
	Amendment No. 12 deals with a point that we discussed earlier—namely, that it is quite wrong that further detention should be allowed solely to obtain evidence by questioning. Of course I appreciate that questioning is an important part of ascertaining whether an offence has been committed, but the reality is that the vast majority of those arrested for alleged terrorist offences usually decline to comment. Alternatively, they might be wholly co-operative because they believe that they will be able to exonerate themselves by providing a complete explanation. I cannot believe that 14 days is not long enough for that process to take place. If detention were to be allowed beyond 14 days merely for questioning, the courts would soon start to find such conduct oppressive.

David Winnick: No, I shall make some progress now.
	Home Office figures show that 357 people were arrested between January 2004, when the 14-day maximum detention period came into force, and September of this year. Of that total, 36 people were held for more than seven days. Last year, moreover, nine people were held for 13 to 14 days. So far this year, two people have been held for the same period of time. All 11 of those held for the longer period have been charged. It is interesting to note that the 14-day period has been in operation only since January last year. That is less than two years, but today we are being asked to jump straight to extending the period to 90 days.
	I have said already that we are concerned with the rule of law, but if we are not also concerned with civil liberties, we should not be here. Our job is to marry up the rule of law and civil liberties, in the circumstances of the acute terrorist danger that faces this country. Those who are content with the 90-day proposal clearly believe that it strikes a proper balance between civil liberties and safeguarding our country, but I do not agree. It is essential that we in the House of Commons are extremely careful about detaining people for a period when no charge is made.
	It is true that, in previous periods of British history, it has been necessary to detain people. I was about 13 or 14 when I learned about what happened in 1939, when the country faced the gravest possible danger. At that time, the leadership of the Mosleyite gang was locked up, under what were known as the 18B regulations. In the circumstances that prevailed at that time, I am sure that the decision of the House of Commons was absolutely right. Incidentally—and I am not trying to make a party-political point—one Conservative MP who was also detained tried to table questions from Brixton prison. As I understand it, the Speaker of the day ruled that he was not in a position to do so.
	The terrorist danger today is acute, but the situation is very different from the circumstances of 1939. We must try to find consensus and a reasonable compromise in this matter. As we have heard in interventions, some hon. Members believe that setting a maximum of 90 days' detention is the right way to proceed. Clearly, I do not believe anything of the kind.
	I hope that we can reach an agreement on 28 days, and that the Home Secretary will recognise the result of our deliberations. If there were to be a free vote on this matter tonight, does anyone doubt what the House's decision would be? Would we opt for 90 days, or 45? I think that the answer is pretty obvious, unless it is argued that those of us who support the amendment do not recognise the extent of the terrorist danger that we face as clearly as others do. However, I do not believe that that argument would be correct.
	For 30 years, the IRA was committed to terrorism, and it carried out terrible bombings and other atrocities on the mainland and in Northern Ireland. In that period, we did our best to protect the Irish community. We made sure that ordinary Irish people were not stigmatised or held in any way responsible for what that bunch of murderous gangsters was doing.
	In the same way, we must extremely careful in our approach to the Muslim community. We know where the terrorist danger comes from. When the IRA was committed to terrorist action, it was no use looking for Muslims, Hindus or anyone else to blame, as we knew that the terrorism was being carried by people from Northern Ireland or the Republic. Similarly, we know that the terrorism that we face now is being perpetrated by a small number of people who are totally isolated, from both the Muslim community and from wider society.
	If we pass into law measures that are seen by the Muslim community as against their interests, we could be in danger, if we were not very careful, of antagonising the very people whom we want as our firm allies—even though that would be the opposite of our intentions. The overwhelming majority of Muslims are against terrorism, just as the overwhelming majority of Irish people said time and again, whenever given the opportunity, that regardless of their views on Northern Ireland and whether there should be a united Ireland, they saw no justification for what the IRA was doing.
	I hope that in reaching a consensus on a sensible approach to this matter, and if my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary shows the necessary flexibility and understanding of our concerns, we will be careful not to antagonise the very people who need to be protected. As I said earlier, Muslims were among the victims of 7 July who were as innocent as anybody else. As regards the vote, I shall listen to what my right hon. Friend has to say. It would not do any harm to resolve this issue once and for all tonight, but if he indicates that 90 days will not be the final result—

Charles Clarke: I hope that it will help the House if I set out the Government's attitude to the amendments and new clauses in this group before the debate concludes.
	On amendment No. 9, I want to express my appreciation to Conservative Front Benchers for spotting a typographical error and correcting it. In the spirit of consensus that orients everything that we do, we urge the House to accept amendment No. 9.
	It is worth setting out the background to amendment No. 8, which I am glad the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) has acknowledged is a probing amendment. Both the police and the Crown Prosecution Service have suggested that it should be possible for Crown prosecutors or their territorial equivalents to make such applications, because in complex terrorist cases the prosecutor will be closely involved from an early stage. The prosecutor will advise the police on which evidence might be useful in court and which might not, and will work with the police in determining which leads might be the most profitable to follow up. Crucially, the prosecutor will also confer closely with the police on the question of when there is sufficient evidence to justify bringing a charge. So the prosecutor will be very familiar with the case and well placed to make an application to the judge for extended detention. I hope that on that basis the hon. Gentleman will consider withdrawing his probing amendment.
	On amendments Nos. 12 and 13, I want to make it clear that the purpose of clause 24 is not to change things but to put beyond doubt what had until recently been believed to be the case. The position was thrown into doubt by an application for judicial review decision case in Northern Ireland. In that case, an individual was being held while DNA samples were being analysed, and he challenged the legality of his continued detention. He was released on the advice of senior Crown counsel. Prior to that, it had been thought that continued detention for such a purpose was lawful—that remains the view on the mainland—but we want to put the matter beyond doubt. Clause 24 therefore sets out the grounds on which a person may be detained. Again, I hope that in the light of that explanation the hon. Member for Beaconsfield will withdraw his probing amendment.
	I now turn to the substance of the debate—the relationship between the length of pre-charge detention and the protections and safeguards that are in place. In this context, I want to comment on express Lord Carlile's report to express appreciation for his approach in conducting it and to indicate our attitude on several of the proposals that have been made, which overlap with some of the amendments.
	Amendments Nos. 10 and 11 suggest that the extension of somebody's period of detention could be dealt with in a more flexible way. There is force in those arguments, and we are prepared to consider that with a view to coming back on Report with an agreed way forward on the matter.
	On the level of the judge who takes the decision, we support Lord Carlile's proposals, as I said on Second Reading. That is the subject of amendments Nos. 29, 30, 31, 32 and 16. We are ready to table an amendment and intend to do so on Report. I take very seriously the point made by the hon. Member for Stone (Mr. Cash). It is important that the judge is a specialist in this field. We shall ensure that the hon. Gentleman's comments are taken into account in the proposal that we make on Report. On the general range of issues involved in this matter, I can give the House the assurances that have been sought from me in a variety of ways.

William Cash: As the Home Secretary knows from discussions that we have had on this matter, the question of the Human Rights Act 1998 has been raised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke), by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) and by Lord Carlile. My new clause 3 would disapply the Act for this purpose. Let us consider the possibility of our getting a 90-day limit—the Home Secretary knows that I have considerable sympathy with the proposals relating to the upper limits—but of the matter then being referred to the courts. I think that the Home Secretary is being a little optimistic, given that Lord Carlile's report—which the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome did not mention—specifically states:
	"I question whether what is proposed in the Bill would be proof to challenge under the Human Rights Act".
	I am sure that the Home Secretary realises that there would be a serious problem involving huge delays if there were to be such a challenge in the courts and, irrespective of what he says about the Attorney-General's view, the provisions were to be struck down. We would lose a vast amount of time and place the public at serious risk if there were a successful challenge.

Charles Clarke: The police believe that 90 days is right, and the Crown Prosecution Service believes that 90 days is right, for the very detailed reasons that I gave in an answer a moment ago. The security services believe that an extension is right and support the recommendation that 90 days is right, but they do not believe that they are professionally competent to judge whether 90 days is right compared to other times. That issue led to confusion in discussing those matters, not least in front of the right hon. Gentleman's Committee, the Intelligence and Security Committee, but the whole of the services involved in this support the police position.
	However, it is the police and the CPS that have the responsibility for conducting these situations. Therefore, all other services have said, "While we support the case for change in general from what we have seen, and while we support the particular police proposal of 90 days, we think that that particular proposal comes from their policing and prosecutorial experience."

John Gummer: On every such occasion, we sought to take action because public opinion demanded it, and because the circumstances were so peculiar a response was demanded of the kind that we would not normally accept. That is why I disagree with my right hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire (Mr. Mates). This is a moment at which this House has to be very careful about taking at face value the good, sensible advice of those whose only commitment is to telling this House what they would in all circumstances most want. It is we who must strike the balance. It is we who must try to understand that it is not just about wishing to prevent this immediate terrorist outrage; we must also ensure that the community in which we live is less likely to support, even tacitly, terrorist activities. In that context, the Northern Irish parallel is vital. In the north of Ireland we have, on occasion—my party has been more guilty of this than any—made decisions on the basis of the immediate threat that have undermined our ability to deal with the longer-term threat, because whole communities have ceased to believe that the law is equally on their side. For me, that consideration meant that I had to vote against the Bill in its entirety.
	We will defeat terrorism in the end only when the communities within which the terrorist hides, or upon whose tacit support the terrorist depends, withdraw any scintilla of support. In this case, we start with a community that is determined to exclude the terrorist, and which knows that terrorism is not the way to respond, however strongly they may feel—and I share those strong feelings—about the way in which western nations have operated, particularly in the middle east.
	Those of who were against the war, and who are unhappy about the uneven-handed attitude, particularly of the United States, to Israel and Palestine, understand why those people should be concerned—and we are proud that our Muslim minority have stood firm against terrorism. I want to keep them there, and I think that we are more likely to do that if we extend the number of days for which people can be locked up without charge by as little as is necessary.
	Apart from the appeal to "those who know"—an appeal that I have always found rather difficult to take—I have heard no good reason for extending the number of days at all. However, I too would be prepared to go for a compromise, so long as the period was as limited as possible. I hope that those on my party's Front Bench will not be led astray to move too far in the direction of the 90 days, because in the end every extra day for which an innocent person is held in prison without trial increases exponentially the possibility that that person will go back to his or her community and say, "This system does not work. It means that people like me have been held unnecessarily, when I am guiltless."
	Finally, I say this to the Home Secretary: the difficulty for his case is the experience of the past year, when so few people have been held for the longer period, when those who have been held for that period have so rarely been charged, and when severe damage has already been done to community relations in the communities from which they come. I beg him to realise that the balance that is necessary must be one that takes strong account of the fact that, as the hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury said, we want to build within this country communities that differ but which share one thing—that the rule of law is established for all of us and protects us all equally. It must not be seen as something that affects some people in a way in which it does not affect the majority.

Ann Widdecombe: Let me say, Mr. Deputy Speaker, how grateful I am for the opportunity to raise this most important issue on the Adjournment. I am moved to do so because I have been approached by Mr. Gary Coyle, the sub-postmaster of Sutton Valence, which, as the Minister will not know, is a most picturesque village on the borders of my constituency. It was once in my constituency, and I was very sad to lose it.
	Sutton Valence post office is well known in the local area because it is the centre of village life. When I first went to live in Sutton Valence 18 years ago, it had several shops. There was a baker, a village store, a newsagent, and of course the sub-post office; today, only the sub-post office remains. If it went out of business, there would be no natural hub of village life in Sutton Valence, and many vital services would not be provided. That is true in one Kentish village on the borders of my constituency, but it is also true of many sub-post offices in many other villages in my constituency and across the entire country.
	The little sub-post office in Sutton Valence has survived while others have closed because Gary Coyle has been full of every last initiative. It has a flourishing retail business that sells everything from woolly jumpers to pencils; it has the lottery—I have bought my own tickets there many a time, some of them very successful—it takes in cleaning, because the nearest dry cleaners is a long way away; it takes in villagers' photographs to be processed; and it advertises, because if one wants to find an electrician in the village, one naturally goes to the post office to read the little postcards at the front.
	I am sure that I am describing to the Minister a scene that he knows very well. However, that scene is seriously under threat. That is why Gary Coyle set up postmasternetwork.co.uk, which assists sub-postmasters all over the country in considering how they can diversify to prop up what is becoming an extremely difficult business to run. Why is it becoming so difficult? The Government are always to blame, of course, but on this occasion they must take a certain share of the blame, inasmuch as there has been a withdrawal of benefits paid through the post office because most pensions are now paid directly into bank accounts.
	I have no objection to that. I am not saying that it is wrong or foolish, but merely that it must be acknowledged that it has had quite an impact on sub-post offices, particularly on little rural ones. Not only has the postmaster lost the commission that he would have got for distributing those benefits, but because people no longer go to the post office to collect their pension, or whatever it may be, they are not in there to buy other services. The throughput of customers has drastically decreased and most sub-postmasters cannot make a living simply from the revenue they receive from the post office.
	There are lots of things that sub-postmasters could do, however, and lots of things that they would like to do. They are not being miserable and saying that there is nothing they can do. They say, "There is plenty we can do. Why won't you, oh Government, via the Post Office, let us do it?"
	Cash machines are an example. A cash machine is an enormous convenience, but never more so than in a rural area. The option is often a bank five miles or more away in the next town or big village. That is certainly the case for my constituents. The nearest cash machine is probably in Headcorn, which is four or five miles down the road. That is fine for people who have an automobile, or for people who go out to work and will be passing a cash machine anyway, but for the people about whom we should be ever more concerned—those who do not have transport and who live in villages to which public transport is extremely bad—the more conveniences they have on their doorstep, the better for them, and not just for the sub-postmaster.
	Sub-post offices may not set up cash machines, however, and they have to obtain a special waiver from the Post Office to see through to completion the contract for any existing arrangements. That is bad for the sub-post office, because it takes from it the revenue it would receive from whoever supplies the cash machine, but it is also appallingly bad for people who live in the village and depend on the cash machine.
	Some particularly enterprising sub-post offices would like to act as bureaux de change. After all, part of their raison d'être is handling money. They have security arrangements; they are used to all that type of thing and would love to act as bureaux de change. Come on, we are talking about Kent. We come out of the channel tunnel with our pockets bursting with euros so we want to go to the sub-post office to change them—[Interruption.] The Minister laughs, but why should not we change our euros at the sub-post office? Can somebody tell me? I do not know why, but the Post Office says, "No".
	Then there is the choice of mail providers. The Government have instructed Postcomm, which is the mail regulator—although I do not need to tell the Minister that—to prepare the mail market "for competition". Fine. Sub-postmasters welcome that. "Yippee", they say, "we will now be able to offer our customers, to their benefit and ours, a choice of mail providers." People could take their packages to Sutton Valence and send them via the Royal Mail, TNT or someone else. No. That is not allowed either under Post Office rules. Sub-post offices can deal only with the Royal Mail. So much for preparing the market for competition.
	The Post Office, due to its near-monopoly position, takes other unfair advantage of small sub-post offices. I have already mentioned one survival strategy for many of those little sub-post offices: the lottery. The Minister will know that shops supplying lottery services have to stay open well beyond core post office hours, yet the Post Office still takes 20 per cent. commission on all lottery tickets issued, despite the fact that sub-postmasters are carrying out that business in their own time. It is not as though sub-postmasters even make that much per ticket, but to pay 20 per cent. commission to the Post Office, which, I think, also owns 20 per cent. of Camelot, is extremely questionable.
	Sub-postmasters are keen to advertise financial products, but they are not allowed to do that either, so they are losing yet more revenue. I do not suggest that they should give advice about financial problems—I can see the difficulty with that; I am talking about advertising and acting as an intermediary for financial products. Again, however, everything is loaded against small rural sub-post offices. If a sub-post office operates in a general store, such as Tesco, it can advertise Tesco financial services.

Barry Gardiner: I have far too much respect for the right hon. Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Miss Widdecombe) to congratulate her, as is customary, on securing this evening's debate. She would not want praise for mere good fortune in the draw. However, perhaps she will allow me to congratulate her on choosing a topic that is at once so broad that every hon. Member will have an interest in it and so narrow, being the subject of an on-going complaint to the Office of Fair Trading that, as Minister, I am precluded from saying almost anything interesting about the specific matter she has raised.
	As it is perhaps the only time this evening that I may be able to, let me expand on that by explaining that the restrictions in sub-postmasters' contracts with Post Office Ltd, which limit the extent to which certain services and products can be offered through a sub-postmaster's associated retail business, are the subject of the complaint that the Association of Convenience Stores made to the Office of Fair Trading, as the right hon. Lady outlined, in a letter dated 30 November last year. The Office of Fair Trading reached a provisional decision on 27 September this year to close its file on the matter, but invited the Association of Convenience Stores to make observations on its findings and provide any further relevant information before a final decision is reached. I understand that the Association of Convenience Stores has confirmed its intention to submit such further information, and that a deadline of 25 November has been set for that.
	The unfortunate—or perhaps fortunate—effect of this is that, as the matter is effectively sub judice, it would be wholly inappropriate for me to comment in any way on this issue or that case. I can, however, comment on what I take to be the underlying concerns expressed by the right hon. Lady, which I share, in respect of two things. The first is that sub-postmasters should be properly remunerated for the work that they do, and assisted to run a commercial operation. The second is that the Post Office should seek to provide an improved service to people qua customers without imposing unsustainable losses on them qua taxpayers.
	The future of the post office is an issue of relevance and concern to every Member of the House. We all share concerns for the future provision of services in our constituencies, and recognise that, until 1999, when the Government launched the £500 million investment fund for information technology, there had been underinvestment in the business for decades.
	Advances in technology, greater mobility, and changes in shopping and financial habits have resulted in a growing proportion of people simply not using the post office as they did in the past, for many reasons. The right hon. Lady referred to the direct payment of benefits, and I wholly accept that that has had a major impact on the decline in volume. However, this is not just about the changes in benefit payment arrangements, which were completed in April. The decline started well before the move to direct payment, and applies not only to those payments but to a much wider range of services, including Girobank, National Savings transactions, telephone bill payments and postal orders.
	For many reasons, custom has declined sharply across the network, and the right hon. Lady was right to point that out. If the post office is to thrive, it needs to change significantly. The Government want to see a post office network that can prosper on the basis of today's and future needs, not on the needs of 20 or 30 years ago. However, we also have to face up to present reality. The rural network is currently subsidised by £150 million a year—a total commitment of £750 million to 2008. The directly managed Crown offices lose £70 million a year, and the deprived urban network sustains a £40 million a year loss.
	Several important steps to restructure and revitalise the post office have already been taken, but the future of the network rightly remains an issue of national debate, and it is clear that there are still major challenges to be faced.

Ann Widdecombe: Oh, go on!

Barry Gardiner: There has been a long tradition of local grocery stores, card shops and so forth also having a post office counter located within them. That has increased footfall for such stores, and that franchise arrangement has proved very satisfactory for those local traders. The right hon. Lady might agree that it is a strange franchise where one takes the most respected brand in the market, which the Post Office is, and uses it to generate footfall in one's own retail outlet, be it a grocery shop or a card store, but is paid for, rather than pays for, that franchise.
	Postcomm, in its advice to Government on the future of the rural network, made 19 recommendations. The major strands of its advice were: that Government needed to clarify their primary reason for maintaining a physical network of offices, that they should end the policy of preventing avoidable closures in the network, and that alternative means of delivery should be introduced to ensure continued access to services, particularly for vulnerable groups. While Postcomm advised that its recommendations should be enacted in relation to the network from April 2006, the Government decided that more time was needed fully to understand the impact of the pilots being trialled by Post Office Ltd. before coming to any final decisions. Accordingly, a two-year extension of the annual support of £150 million, subject to state aid clearance, was announced in Parliament in September 2004. The Government want to be sure that we have considered all angles before taking a decision about the future of the network.
	Postcomm recommended that the Government should clarify their primary reason for wanting to maintain a physical network of post offices. I completely agree that it is of fundamental important that we have a clear vision for the network of tomorrow. Without it, the network is likely to contract in an unstructured way, hitting the most vulnerable groups in our society the hardest If we do want to maintain a physical network, over and above that which Post Office Ltd would run commercially, we must be able to justify the high costs that that would incur.
	Postcomm also recognised that it was becoming increasingly difficult to find suitable people interested in taking on full-time post offices when they came on to the market. That is why it recommended the removal of the policy to prevent all avoidable closures. As a result, we will review that policy in light of the pilot report. In the meantime, however, we have adapted the interpretation of the policy to allow Post Office Ltd more flexibility to retain service provision in a location without the absolute need for that always to be on the same basis as that in relation to the departing sub-postmaster or mistress.
	Inevitably, however, there are post offices that cannot be retained no matter how much effort is put into finding a new sub-postmaster or sub-postmistress. Increasingly, that is likely to be more common. Rural post offices must be sustainable. At present, however, the number of customers is simply too small to make such businesses attractive. One customer every hour and a half might give a whole new meaning to the phrase, "an unhurried retail environment", but it is hardly an attractive business proposition. That said, we must not make the mistake of believing that this is a problem only for the smallest rural outlets with high fixed costs and low footfall. In all but 1 per cent. of the 8,000 rural offices across the country, it costs Post Office Ltd more to provide the service than it takes back over the counter. Post Office Ltd loses money on the other 99 per cent. of those rural post offices. That indicates clearly that this is not simply a structural matter of outlets and fixed costs but equally about contracts and variable costs.
	That is why I am pleased to tell the House that Post Office Ltd has been working closely with the National Federation of Sub-Postmasters to move sub-postmasters' remuneration to a more transaction-based and commercially-oriented structure, with the fixed payment element much reduced. It is important that a mutually beneficial relationship continues to develop between Post Office Ltd and sub-postmasters and mistresses—a relationship that rewards delivery and thus incentivises a more commercial approach. The new contract has been implemented across the urban network, and in my view it will be important to maintain this impetus and to examine carefully the scope for further broadening the transaction-based contract structure to the rest of the network.
	Post Office Ltd is at a key point in its development, particularly in relation to generating new income from the financial services and other products that it has recently launched. It has already had considerable success in showing customers that pots offices are no longer simply places to visit to collect pensions or benefits, but now a good place to get foreign currency, ask about car insurance or top up credit on a mobile phone. All those services are being provided through Post Office Ltd. The company is working hard to build on that success, to ensure that post offices remain relevant and are not left behind in a rapidly changing marketplace. Looking ahead, the greatest uncertainty, I believe, is customer behaviour. It will be customers—our constituents—who largely dictate the future of the business.
	Question put and agreed to.
	Adjourned accordingly at five minutes to Eight o'clock.